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INTRODUCTION
My remit on this panel is to discuss the constitutional role of
transnational courts. This is a big topic that can be best approached by
working through some concrete examples to a more general point. Given
that our session will be held on September 11, it is particularly timely to
use the relationship between transnational and domestic courts in the
global anti-terrorism campaign for illustration.
* Kim Lane Scheppele is the George W. Crawford Visiting Professor of Law, Yale
Law School, 2009-2010, and the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and
Public Affairs, Director, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University. This
paper was prepared for the panel on "Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy" at the
meeting of the International Law Schools Association, Washington DC, 11 September
2009. This work is a condensation of some arguments I make in my book-in-progress
entitled, THE INTERNATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY: SOVEREIGNTY, LEGALITY, AND
TRANSNATIONALITY AFTER 9/11 (forthcoming).
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THREE DIMENSIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONGST
TRANSNATIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL LEVELS
Here is the general argument: both national and transnational courts
negotiate their relationships to each other in a larger "three-dimensional
political space" that consists of more political actors than just courts.
The idea of a three-dimensional space is a metaphor, of course, but it
roughly tracks the common thought that the relationship between
national and transnational bodies (or between national and sub-national
bodies) is vertical while the relationships among courts and institutions
within each level (transnational, national or sub-national) are horizontal.
Considering horizontal and vertical relations together gives us a three-
dimensional political space because each dimension comes with its own
depth of complicated relationships, a depth provided by a history of
interactions among political and legal institutions within each level.
Imagine playing chess on a three-dimensional chessboard where a
piece from one level can knock out a piece from another or where a
particularly important player can escape to another level for safety.
Sometimes, moves on one level of the chessboard can be duplicated at
other levels only after time passes. Sometimes moves on one level speed
the moves on another. Transnational and national courts are both players
in the game of transnational constitutionalism, but they do not exist
simply in a hierarchical relationship to each other. They are somewhat
differently positioned in this three-dimensional space with different sorts
of opportunities for maneuver. National and transnational courts can and
often do reinforce each other's ideas. Both national and transnational
courts can increase the commitment to constitutionalism present in the
three-dimensional space by using principled legal ideas to counter
political action that is inconsistent with these principles.
In this three-dimensional space, the pressures for both lawmaking
and for normative control over this lawmaking come from many angles.
Sometimes domestic laws are passed to comply with international or
regional mandates, so the pressures for having these laws in the first
place comes from the international to national level. Sometimes
transnational law grows from the parallel actions of many national
parliaments, causing the pressure to go the other way, from the national
to the transnational level. These pressures (from national up and from
transnational down) produce laws at all levels that are intertwined. The
overlapping jurisdiction of courts across these levels is particularly
intricate because national laws and practices under those laws can
sometimes be adjudicated in transnational courts and national courts
often have to interpret transnational law. Sometimes law is interpreted in
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both sorts of courts at once, usually harmoniously but sometimes not. In
general, though, transnational and national courts share a common
commitment to methods and values that distinguish them in the political
space from other political institutions.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC COURTS IN
THE GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN
All of this is very abstract. Let us make it more concrete by looking
at the relationship between transnational and domestic courts in the
global anti-terrorism campaign.
Before getting to the "courts" part, let's first pause on the phrase the
"global anti-terrorism campaign." I use this rather novel phrase to make
several points about contemporary terrorism law:
0 The fight against terrorism is truly a global phenomenon.
Since 9/11 almost every country in the world has passed new
legislation or tweaked old legislation with the aim of fighting
terrorism.' Many countries would have created such laws
out of a national sense of threat in any event. But it is clear
that a number of countries developed their legislation
primarily in response to international mandates, coming
from the UN Security Council and regional bodies like the
European Union, the Organization of American States, the
African Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations
and others.2 While these transnational bodies have pressed
states to combat terrorism by being very aggressive in
fighting terrorism, human rights bodies within many of these
same transnational organizations (the UN, the EU and the
OAS in particular) have attempted to prevent states from
abusing human rights as they carry out this fight. Since
9/11, transnational bodies have played an immense role in
coordinating international terrorism strategies. The anti-
terrorism fight is global and globally coordinated.
1. Evidence for this proposition can be found in the country reports submitted to
the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) which has been charged
with ensuring the enforcement of the wave of resolutions, starting with S.C. Res. 1373,
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001). For additional
information on the CTC, see United Nations, Security Council Counter-Terrorism
Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/. For additional information regarding the country
reports, see United Nations, CTC: Reports Submitted by Member States,
http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports/Creports.shtml.
2. For an early review of the transnational efforts, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Other
People's Patriot Acts: Europe's Response to September 11, 50 Loy. L. REv. 89, 91-97
(2004).
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" While most commentators talk about "counter-terrorism," I
prefer "anti-terrorism" because "anti-terrorism" does not
presuppose that terrorism has already happened and needs
therefore to be countered. The term is meant to highlight
that the efforts are focused against a thing called terrorism,
even though it may not have appeared yet in the particular
space where the laws are generated to fight it. For example,
Vanuatu,3 which passed a giant new terrorism package in the
face of no particular threat, may find that the primary effect
of these laws is to gain approval from the international
community.
" Instead of calling the global effort a "war" against terrorism
or even a multinational effort against organized crime, the
term "campaign" better captures the spirit of the post 9/11
legal space. Post-9/11 anti-terrorism efforts started with a
"you're with us or against us" frameworka-much like a
political or a cause-related campaign. States around the
world have signed on, even states that have experienced very
little threat of terrorism from either domestic or transnational
sources, just to demonstrate that they are on the right side of
the fight. As with many campaigns, it is at least as important
to appear to be doing something as to actually be doing
whatever it takes. And it is important to cheer on the efforts
of others as they join the campaign too.
After eight years of the anti-terrorism campaign, the world is now
full of transnational binding resolutions, legal frameworks and plans of
3. See The Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu, Report by the Republic of
Vanuatu to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Made Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, U.N. Doc. S/2003/497 (Apr. 28, 2003),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO3/347/86/PDF/
N0334786.pdf?OpenElement; Report of the Republic of Vanuatu on the Actions Taken by
the Government to Implement Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), U.N. Doc.
S/2007/139 (Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Vanuatu 2007 Report], available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/267/84/PDF/N0726784.pdfOpen
Element. As Vanuatu reported in 2007, "Since the [comprehensive anti-terrorism law]
commenced effect in February 2006 no cases have been identified by authorities in
Vanuatu requiring investigation or prosecution for offences contained in the Act.
However, authorities continue to place a high priority on the investigation and
prosecution of any suspected offences and on improving their operational readiness to
enforce the legislation." Vanuatu 2007 Report, supra note 3, at 4.
4. You Are Either With Us Or Against Us, CNN, Nov. 6, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001[US/1 1/06/gen.attack.on.terror/ (quoting then-President
George W. Bush).
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action that are being pushed down to the national level. National
governments have by and large been quite speedy about bringing these
ideas into national law. But the influence goes the other way too.
National governments-particularly the US after 9/11, European
governments after the attack on the London tube and the Madrid train
bombings, and Russia after the Moscow theater siege, and the Beslan
school hostage-taking in North Ossetia-have pressed transnational
bodies to require of all governments the same actions they are taking
themselves. It is no coincidence that UN Security Council Resolution
1373, passed on 28 September 2001, mirrors almost exactly the strategy
for fighting terrorism that one sees in the USA PATRIOT Act, which the
US was drafting at the same time as it was urging the Security Council to
act.5
ANTI-TERRORISM LAWS AND RESULTING CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
Where are courts in all of this? The burst of lawmaking about
terrorism has generated a corresponding burst of constitutional
challenges to these laws around the world. High courts in the US,
Canada, Spain, Germany, the UK, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Peru,
Colombia, Poland, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and others have had to
rule on the constitutionality of anti-terrorism laws since 9/11, and most
of these courts have found the anti-terrorism laws to be unconstitutional
at least in part. For example:
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW), created by the European
Union Framework Decision of June 2002, ensures that a
suspect located anywhere in the EU will be extradited to the
EU country that seeks to put that suspect on trial.6 The EAW
is a document, which provides for general application.
Passasage of the EAW was hastened by the 9/11 attacks and
the collective need to find a way to try suspected terrorists
across Europe. Governments across Europe quickly enacted
the EAW into domestic law, and those domestic laws were
quickly challenged before constitutional courts. The
5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(USA PATRIOT Act).
6. For more on the European Arrest Warrant in general, see European Commission,
Justice and Home Affairs, European Arrest Warrant Replaces Extradition Between EU
Member States, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/criminal/extradition/fsjscriminal-
extraditionen.htm. See also Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 2001 O.J. (L
190) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUfiServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2002:190:0001:0018:EN:PDF (bringing the EAW into effect in June 2002).
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constitutional courts of Germany, Poland, and Cyprus found
that the EAW violated their national constitutions. These
national courts found either that their countries' constitutions
expressly forbid such extradition (and would require an
amendment to permit the EAW) or that national constitutional
principles would not countenance a citizen of that country
being sent for trial elsewhere without guarantees of fair
process equivalent to those in the home country.7
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany struck down
several post-9/11 laws as unconstitutional, some (like the
European Arrest Warrant Case) with implications for European
coordination of terrorism investigations. In the Dragnet case,
the Federal Constitutional Court held that the use of data
mining techniques to locate terrorism suspects violated the
personality rights of those whose information was accessed,
unless the police had a concrete suspicion about that particular
individual before the data search was initiated.8 The Court
also issued a preliminary injunction against the application of
the law based on the post-9/11 European regulations on data
storage and information sharing, holding that use of the stored
data for anything other than investigation of a serious criminal
offense was not consistent with the German Basic Law.9 In
both cases, these decisions put a halt to German participation
7. See generally, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] July 18, 2005, 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
2236/04 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/
rs20050718_2bvr223604en.html; Trybunal Konstytucyjny (Polish Constitutional Court),
Apr. 27, 2005, OTK ZU No. 4/A/2005, item 42 (P 1/05) (Pol.), available at
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/summaries-assets/documents/P- 105-full-
GB.pdf; Cyprus Supreme Court, Nov., 7, 2005 (294/2005), available at www.cylaw.org
(Greek language). See also ndlez Ustavniho soudu (Czech Republic Constitutional
Court) cj. 66/2004/Sbirka nlezu a usneseni Ostavniho soudu (Collection of Court
Decisions of the Constitutional Court) (Czech Rep.), available at http://angl.concourt.cz/
angl-verze/doc/pl-66-04.php. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, however,
upheld the domestic constitutionality of the European Arrest Warrant even though the
constitution explicitly forbids the extradition of citizens to other countries to stand trial
Czech Republic. Ndlez (Ostavniho soudu (Czech Republic Constitutional Court) cj.
66/2004/Sbirka ndlezu a usneseni 1Ustavniho soudu, Conclusion.
8. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 4,
2006, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 518/02, 115 (320)
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs
20060404_1bvrO51802.html (Rasterfahndung [Dragnet] Case) (German language).
9. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar.
11, 2008, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 256/08 (F.R.G),
available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg08-037en.html (In the
Matter of Data Retention).
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in the creation and use of transnational databases in fighting
terrorism across Europe.In 2003, the Constitutional Court of
Peru declared the 1992 presidential decrees that had provided
the framework for fighting domestic terrorism since that time
to be unconstitutional.' ° Both the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights as well as the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights found that arrests, trials, and convictions under
these laws violated the American Convention on Human
Rights." The decision by the Constitutional Court, therefore,
brought the decisions of the transnational courts directly into
domestic law. But after the terrorism laws were struck down,
the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the UN Security
Council pointedly asked Peru:
The CTC understands that the Peruvian Supreme Court [sic] declared
four anti-terrorism laws enacted in the early 1990s as
unconstitutional. Which laws have been declared unconstitutional
and why? How will this affect the implementation of [UN Security
Council Resolution 1373]? What plans are there for introducing new
laws or revisions to the existing legislation? When is this likely to
happen? How effective is the current legislation as it stands?
12
Clearly, the Counter-Terrorism Committee was not amused by the
Constitutional Court's judgment and has been pressing Peru to enact new
anti-terrorism laws that will cover the same ground.
0 Throughout the Commonwealth after 9/11, country after
country has adopted Canada's strategy of using "security
certificates" (sometimes under the British terminology of
"control orders") to detain terrorism suspects.' 3  Security
10. Marcelino Tineo Silva y mcs de 5,000 ciudadanos [Marcelino Tineo Silva and
More Than 5,000 Citizens], Exp. No. 010-2002-AI/TCLIMA Constitutional Court of
Peru (Jan. 3, 2003), available at http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2003/00010-2002-
AI.html (Spanish language).
11. See Ralph Ruebner et al., The War on Terrorism: Peru's Past and Present, A
Legal Analysis (Aug. 2004) (unpublished working paper, on file with The John Marshall
Law School), available at http://www.jmls.edu/facultypubs/ruebner/perureport.pdf
(discussing of the large number of rulings against these laws from the Inter-American
Commission and the Inter-American Court).
12. See Letter Supplementing the Report of the Government of Peru on Compliance
with Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), U.N. Doc. S/2004/589 (July 22, 2004),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO4/440/46/PDF/
N0444046.pdfOpenElement. The CTC does not publish the questions it asks specific
countries as it presses them to fight terrorism. One can only learn about these questions
if the country includes them with its list of responses, as Peru did in this case.
13. States within the Commonwealth were encouraged to pass the draft model
terrorism law. See MODEL LEGIS. PROVISIONS ON MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM § 7
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certificates are generally issued by a government minister in
order to detain a terrorism suspect, potentially indefinitely,
because the minister finds that the suspect in question is too
dangerous to be left at large, but not capable of being
prosecuted because of the nature of the evidence involved. In
the case of non-nationals, detention may be justified because
the country to which a suspect would be deported might torture
him. Unfit for either prosecution or deportation and held in a
sort of legal limbo, detainees in Canada, the UK, and Australia
have brought legal challenges. The Canadian Supreme Court
required the government to modify the procedures by which
detainees were held;1 4 the British Law Lords also required
changes in the control order regime before the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) weighed in with even more changes
to the system. 15 The Rapporteur on Protecting Human Rights
while Combating Terrorism within the Office of the UN High
Commissioner on Human Rights recommended that Australia
voluntarily comply with the legal standards set by the British
courts and European Court of Human Rights even though the
country is not formally bound by decision of those courts.'
6
It is not just national constitutional courts that have issued a number
of decisions on the legality of anti-terrorism measures after 9/11.
Transnational courts have covered that ground too:
0 In the Kadi and al Barakaat case, a Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Justice ruled on the validity of a European
(2002) (tracking the British law and practice with regard to the wording on control
orders), available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared-asp-files/uploadedfiles/
%7B32AF830D-F83A-4432-8051-750C789531A5%7Dfinalterrorismilaw.pdf.
14. See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350,
2007 SCC 9 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/ 2 00 7 scc9/2 00 7
scc9.pdf.
15. See A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56 (U.K.) (also
known as The Belmarsh Case), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld2004O5/ldjudgmt/jdO4l2l6/a&others.pdf; Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. AF,
[2009] UKHL 28 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200809/ldjudgmt/jd0906l0/af.pdf. For the European Court of Human Rights case, see
Case of A. and Others v. U.K., App. No. 3455/05 (2009), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (enter 3455/05 in the
Application Number field).
16. U.N. Human Rights Council [HRC], Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, Australia: Study on Human Rights Compliance While Countering
Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/26/Add.3 (Dec. 14 2006) (prepared by Martin Scheinin),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/155/49/PDF/
G0615549.pdf?OpenElement.
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Union regulation that brought into European law the legal
capacity required by the UN Security Council to immediately
freeze the assets of suspected terrorists. 7 The European
regulation, like many national regulations, provided for asset
freezes as soon as a suspected terrorist was placed on the UN
terrorism watch list, without any notification to the target
before the freeze took place or any process after the freeze was
in effect for the target to provide evidence that he should not
be treated as a suspected terrorist. In a September 2008
judgment that has already generated much (mostly favorable)
commentary, the ECJ prospectively voided the EU regulation
because it failed to provide a fair process for the person
affected to challenge the freeze.'
8
In the Ocalan case, arising on pre-9/11 facts in a post-9/11
judgment, the European Court of Human Rights made it clear
that 9/11 had not changed its views on the human rights
standards to be applied in terrorism trials.1 9  In this case
involving one of Turkey's most notorious domestic terrorists,
the ECtHR held that Ocalan's rights to fair judicial process to
challenge his detention had been compromised, that a special
tribunal including members of the armed forces was not
adequate to guarantee the European Convention's requirement
of an independent tribunal, and that his trial had therefore been
so unfair that the resulting sentence of death violated the
prohibition against inhuman and degrading punishment.
17. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat
Int'l Found. v. Council of the European Union & Comm'n of the EC, 2008 ECJ (Sept. 3,
2008), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/J_6/ (enter "C-402/05 P" in the Case
No. field, then click on the link next to "Judgment").
18. See, e.g., Grdinne de Bfirca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J 1 (2009); W.T. Eijsbouts & Leonard
Besselink, 'The Law of Laws'--Overcoming Pluralism,' 4 EuR. CONST. L. REv. 395
(2008); Stefan Griller, International Law, Human Rights and the European Community's
Autonomous Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi, 4
EuR. CONST. L. REV. 528 (2008); Daniel Halberstam & Eric Stein, The United Nations,
the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights
in a Plural World Order, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 13 (2009); Bjom Kunoy & Anthony
Dawes, Plate Tectonics in Luxembourg: The Manage d Trois Between EC Law,
International Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Following the UN
Sanctions Cases, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 73 (2009).
19. Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 174 (2005), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (enter "46221/99" in the
Application Number field).
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has taken
precautionary measures in favor of detainees at Guantinamo
Bay, Cuba, holding first in a resolution on 12 March 2002 that
the United States had an obligation to determine the legal
status of the detainees in a competent tribunal. Later
precautionary measures were issued that called upon the
United States to investigate claims of torture. Taking note of
the case of the US Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
(2006) as well as criticisms of Guantdnamo by mandate
holders of the Human Rights Commission and the official
report of the Committee Against Torture, the Inter-American
Commission passed resolution 2/06 in 2006, again calling
upon the United States to provide the detainees with a
competent tribunal and to investigate claims of torture.2 °
These cases from transnational judicial and quasi-judicial bodies
could be multiplied, just as the cases from the national courts could be.
There has been a great deal of judicial activity covering nearly all phases
of the global anti-terrorism campaign.
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL IMPACT OF JUDGMENTS ON NATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL LAW
What is crucial to note in all of these cases, however, is that each
legal judgment operates in a space occupied both by other judicial bodies
and by national as well as transnational law. In the European Arrest
Warrant cases and the German post-9/ll data protection cases,
European-wide efforts were stopped by national constitutional courts. In
the Peruvian anti-terrorism law case, national law was voided by a
national court, though only after a transnational court had first found the
state practices under the law incompatible with the regional human rights
treaty. In the Commonwealth security certificate cases, national court
decisions that provided constitutional checks on executive discretion
were urged upon other states for whom those decisions were not binding.
International actors got into the act in urging courts to adopt decisions
based on the rulings of other courts from outside their jurisdictions.
At the transnational level, the decisions of the European Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights provided models of
legal argument for domestic actors within the states that are members of
the European Union as well as the states that are members of the Council
20. Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Resolution No. 2/06, On Guantanamo
Bay Precautionary Measures (July 28, 2006), available at http://www.cidh.org/
resolutions/resolution2.06.htm.
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of Europe. The Inter-American Commission decisions on Guantdnamo
attempted to influence a national government with its own authority, but
also with the authority of the decisions of that country's highest court
(the US Supreme Court) as well as report and recommendations of
transnational bodies (the Committee against Torture and the Human
Rights Commission). In each case, the transnational judicial bodies tried
to supplement national courts to reinforce the same principles.
From these examples, we can see that the constitutional role of
transnational courts is not so easy to describe. Transnational courts are
not super appeals courts that hover above a national legal system ready to
rule on the domestic law of those states. Nor are they bodies that
primarily backstop national courts. Instead, transnational courts issue
decisions that provide principled bases for the judgments of other
political bodies, from transnational institutions to national governments
to national high courts. National courts are also not purely national
anymore, if indeed they ever were. Increasingly, national courts are
being called upon to rule on matters that have implications far beyond a
country's borders. It is much harder than it used to be to find a legal
issue that is either purely national or purely transnational.
Constitutionalism in this complex three-dimensional political space
is the application of principled legal ideas to the business of governing.
Both transnational and national courts have been active carving out a
space for constitutional judgment. It is clear that there is more principled
legal argument across this three-dimensional political space because
courts have been active at all levels.

